China’s Nuclear Deterrence – Is It the Same as Russia and the United States

Tainas, nuclear deterans, are the same as Russia and the United States. Going for a bit of a walk along Pontonby Road here in Auckland this morning, as people head off to work, up on the bus, head for the train, head into the city and off to work. So let's have a look at China's nuclear deterrence. It's relevant because there's been a lot of change there in recent weeks and months. So China is rapidly expanding its nuclear forces while still officially maintaining no first-use policy. The United States and Russia operate under very different doctrines built around large arsenals and flexible response options. The question here today is whether China's approach is it essentially the same as the two established nuclear superpowers or fundamentally different recent additions, including the airborne leak with H6N bombers and JL1 missiles make this comparison more urgent because there's been a significant step change in capability. So when these things happen, it's prudent to go and have a bit of a look at the doctrine and see if it's materially changed or if it has the potential to be rapidly changed to modify their doctrine. So today we'll go and examine their stated doctrine as much as we can gather from public statements, and how it's evolving and where it aligns or where it diverges with US and Russian practice, and it does. So China's official nuclear doctrine has long rested on no first-use and minimum deterrence. And the goal was secure second strike capability, so that's the main goal. So sufficient to the two attack, not to match the US in terms of the number of munitions, and not to match Russia in terms of the number of munitions of the decades. This means a relatively small arsenal focused on survival-survivable land-based missiles. The blue breeze in here and constantly. And this is Central. Central. Good little spot. Yeah, so recent years China has accelerated the construction of silos, the construction of road mobile systems, and ballistic missile submarines and an air-launched component. The United States and Russia maintain far larger stockpiles and doctrines that include options for first-use or early use under certain conditions. That there is a, I don't know, it's a bit of a surprise to me, is it a surprise to you? That there is a real surprise to me. It wasn't quite clear to me that both Russia and the United States have reserved the right to use nuclear weapons on the basis of a first strike. You kind of watch a bunch of movies and TV and fiction basically over the years, and you're led to believe certain things. And the hunt for red October. There's so many fictitious stories, wonderful stories, great TV. But, you know, the facts are, you know, both the United States, America and Russia. They both reserved the right to use nuclear weapons on a first-use basis. So either I always thought it was like, well, you know, if you use them, then we've got essentially a nuclear mutually assured destruction deterrence. But we won't do it if you don't do it. That's not the case. It's actually not the case. That is not the case. They're doctrine, both doctrines include the ability to use them under certain conditions for first use. Yeah, and both have ever historically prepared for limited nuclear options, as well as all our exchanges. So they're prepared for, you know, both scenarios. Yeah, pretty surprising, really. I don't know if you knew about that. Well, comment below. Tell me because, yeah, I'd always thought that it was all MAD. I thought it was all, you know, we won't go. You won't go. We won't go. But if you go, we go. I thought that was the story, but that is not the case. So China, back to China. So China now feels a maturing, nuclear triad, comprised of land-based, I've got to go get the milk team. So I've got to go and find just found a little dairy. So I'll shoot across there and get some milk. China, yeah, China. Let's get back to China. So land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs, airborne leg by the H6N and the JL1 will have a separate episode about those platforms. Really important to understand what they are. The official posture remains no first use for China. So China is different. They are different from Russia, and they are different from the United States of America. They are policy. Their policy is, now this can change, stroke of a pen, it can change. So I'm not saying they're locked and loaded. I'm saying their current posture, their current policy. As far as we in the West can understand it, there's no first use. They are definitely no first use. China states it will not be the first to use nuclear weapons under any circumstances. They won't use a tactical nuke. If anybody does something crazy, they're not going to use a tactical nuke. So that's a pretty important distinction to understand and feel where off. But I'm still, like, I'm really surprised that that's not the position of the West or Russia. We've got a very different perspective on this. So yeah. So yeah, in practice, the emphasis is shifting from pure minimum deterrence toward a more robust and diversified second strike force. Rapid growth in warhead numbers in silo fields, delivery systems has narrow quantitative gap. So the number of munitions that they have, they've narrowed that gap with the old nuclear powers of the United States of America and Russia, Russia, Russia. Chinese writings, the work that they have allowed to be published to be surfaced with their adversaries, they stress survivability. They stress second strike capability. It goes a concrete truck off to do a big job. It's really misty here in Auckland this morning. I'm up on Ponton B Road, which is, I don't know, it's kind of like the gentrified part of this city. It's quite a big city now. It's over a million people in Auckland. It's the commercial hub of New Zealand, and it's kind of got a Sydney vibe, it's like fairly sort of similar sort of feeling to Sydney. It's a very cool town, like it's a really cool place to be in the world. I would rate Auckland as one of the best cities in the world, absolutely fantastic place. It's just a long way, like it's in, it's basically, if you travel to the art end of nowhere, well this is beyond that. Like you've got to buy another ticket after that to get to here, it's so bloody far, but if you are here, it's a really cool place. Yeah, this is a, yeah, Ponton B in Auckland. Yeah, so we talked about those Chinese writings, right? They stressed survivability and the second strike capability. And but, but, but, but, but, but, but. With anything Chinese, very, very hard to get a read on what their formal position is. The transparency remains much, much lower than in the United States or Russian systems, which leaves us to, you know, really guess a lot about what their actual intent is. Outside observers, we have to infer the intent from their knowing capabilities. So, first of all, you got to know what their capabilities are, so there's got a lot of sleuthing them and satellite imagery and other sensors that are used to trying to detect what they've actually got. And then you've got to try and deduce from that what their capabilities is. And then from that, you've got to try and deduce what modifications to their doctrine they may be considering or they may have already put into effect without publishing it. If you know what I mean. Yeah, so the ripple effects. So the United States and Russia, there's a rubbish truck. We had to clean up the suburbs. The United States and Russia both reject no first use. Their doctrines allow nuclear use in response to extreme conventional threats or to control escalation. Both maintain, this is even across the road here in the fog. I can't see a bloody thing. Look at that. Look at that. I mean, if the tears are coming along here, I won't hear it, it'll knock me over. Okay, I'm safe. Here we go. Let's go look at the flowers. Yeah, so their doctrines allow nuclear use in response to extreme conventional threats or to control escalation. Oh, look at that. Fruit and vegetables. There you go. Daffodils, tulips. Barlia, gypsophilia. Limonium. Limonium. Columbian roses. Yeah, the Daffodils look great, don't they? White, pink, lily. Freezers, iris. Pionis. Pionis? Is that anything so? Pionis. Snap dragons. Snap dragons. White stock. Astromeria. Assorted crissies or chrysanthemums, I presume. Yeah, all these lots of different crissies here. Gerberus. Lots of Gerberus down the bottom there. Some eucalypts, some proteas, baby magnolias. Well, rice flour, kale. Well, look at the kale. Look at that. I think you can probably go home and eat that. Two bucks each? That's not bad. Green orchids. Gosh, what a great range. Look at that. What are these ones called? What are they called? Oh, it's going to come to me. It'll be a label there somewhere. Birds of paradise, of course. The bird of paradise. That's a pretty cool plant in there. Look at that flower. Very stunning. There we go. Let's have a look in that store. Have they got milk? I don't know if they've got milk. I'm sure they'll have milk. We'll pop in there and see if they've got some milk. The first of all, we'll continue with our story. Let's go. Yeah, so Russian American doctrines allow first use. Both maintain larger, more flexible, arsenals designed for a range of contingencies, including limited nuclear options. There you go to the bus. There's the number 866 on Fontaineer Road. Yeah, China's in if you pledge. If credible, if credible. They can change it. I mean, don't get me wrong. I'm not saying, oh, you know, they're fine. Don't worry about it. They're not at all because they can change it. Just like that. If they deem a credible threat or for any reason, they can just go and change their doctrine with the stroke of a pen. You better believe it. They're pledge. They're credible. Create a clearer, a much clearer threshold. Nuclear weapons are reserved for retaliation after a nuclear attack. In practice, expanding Chinese forces increase the complexity of crisis stability because both sides must now plan against a more capable second stroke force. Now, Russia's doctrine has grown more explicit about nuclear signaling in conventional conflict. China's remains much more restrained in public statements, at least in public statements. The US continues to modernize its triad while retaining first use options and China is modernizing while still publicly rejecting first use. That's a pretty major difference. Now, yeah, and again, I'm not saying you should believe this because it might be total BS if you know what I mean. But in terms of signaling, the Chinese have got a much better position in terms of their rejection of first use, at least at the moment. The biggest practical difference is scale. Absolutely. An operational flexibility. I'm not sure about that one, but yeah. US and Russian forces are built for a wider spectrum of nuclear employment. China's remains oriented toward a steward retaliation. It's probably true, actually. They've had a lot more time to develop operational excellence when it comes to all of this stuff. A little snippet there. Have another snippet. Yeah. Yeah, and as Chinese numbers and diversity grow, the doctrinal gap may narrow even if the official language remains, which is my point, it's really they have the ability quite quickly to change their doctrine without modifying their much more passive language compared to Russia and China, which openly allow, I mean, they just openly allow the first use, whereas China does not. Right, so, let's wrap. So, doctrine is not the same. I guess the point is, and the question was, is there doctrine the same when it comes to use of these sorts of systems? Is it the same as Russia? Is it the same as the United States? No, it's not. It is not at all. They reject first use. That is a material difference, but I stress that's on paper. They reject it. They can change that with a stroke of a pen. You better believe it. The core difference is that any of you primary focus on second strike. But in terms of the core capability, there goes the school bus, number 505. This bus is 100% electric. There you go, isn't that great? Go back to the bus stop, plug it in, charge it up. Everybody's, every, every other car here seems to be a Tesla. Oh no, there goes the BYD, I take it back. There you go. Build your dreams. BYD at O3. Yeah. Yeah, so in terms of the gap closing, China is building a more survivable and diversified force that looks increasingly like a classic nuclear triad. The practical effect is greater mutual vulnerability and higher states in any future crisis. Whether or not the NFU pledge remains fully credible under extreme pressure is the central open question. I think the answer is you better watch out because they will change that. They will align with the other two and very quickly. It would only take one incident to modify their posture in my humble opinion team. So look, I hope you've enjoyed the number 866 in New Market. There you go. There's bunch of people after work. And I hope you've enjoyed walking down Ponziby Road in the fog. And I hope you've enjoyed the flowers, eh? Aren't they beautiful? Look at this. Just awesome. Just awesome. And I hope wherever you are I'll take you. I hope you have a really awesome day. Cheers.